In these situations decisions can be fully explained by reference to international context. The debate about balancing nonetheless survived, yet its parameters shifted somewhat in response to these political developments. However, the strength of parliaments in this realm varies greatly across democracies and little is known about the sources of this variation. Social actors often do not react immediately to variation in their wider context. . The colleagues may only look at their own budgets and only pursue what they regard as absolute gains, and still their policies will necessarily have balancing effects for the system. Policy change after shifts in the power distribution is, of course, a process in time.
However, they run into different problems. In other words, once a set of institutions has been established, it pays to stick to them — even in situations in which it would seem rational to set up a different set of institutions had there not already existed one. Research has examined state-level variables like the influence of material state characteristics Rosenau 1966; Rummel 1972, 1979 or culture Hudson 1997. However, this argument should not be understood as a rephrasing of recent arguments about soft balancing. They add further variables which presumably affect how states translate constraints and incentives stemming from the international system into foreign policy. Waltz defines power in terms of capabilities. Both new institutional economics and historical institutionalism argue that once institutions are in place there are powerful forces that will stabilize them even under changing circumstances albeit to varying degrees.
War powers have been contested between governments and parliamentsthroughout the history of democ. These indeed produce strong coordination effects. Sensitivity to possibly confounding influences thus is an important characteristic of good case study work George and McKeown 1985: 32—4. Or would it have been used to produce an even greater economic surplus? There can be no legitimate global order without taking into account what these actors regard as legitimate, and this will not necessarily be a model based on Western democracy. For better readability and to be better able to account for changes in the international incentive structure, this time period is split up in three phases.
Also, if a group of actors commonly appeal to certain standards of behavior in order to justify or condemn certain actions, this may be such an indicator. Chapter 3 will discuss in more detail the methodological requirements and why single case studies or the structured comparison of single cases are particularly well-suited to meet them. In particular there is no single state that obviously qualifies as an anchor for a balancing coalition. I will argue that this is not due to some inexplicable inertia inherent in the actors, which causes them to react to a changing environment only with some unspecified time lag. First, I will in general reflect on how structures affect policies. But they played markedly different roles - the former endorsing the idea from the beginning, the latter dragging its heels and only reluctantly becoming a supporter. Otherwise prospective gains in autonomy vis-à-vis the United States would be traded for a loss in autonomy against comparable countries, which would not make sense.
Attempts from both camps to find some middle ground most often took the form of formulating scope conditions: Under certain conditions states would focus on absolute gains and thus be inclined to form and maintain international institutions; under others states would strive for relative gains and thus tend to disregard them Grieco 1988; Keohane 1989: 15, 18; 1993: 274—83. The strength of these constraints differed, with Britain facing significantly stronger restrictions than Germany. I will outline the design for a study of these policies to illustrate how the abstract advice translates into a concrete research endeavor. A state that does not adjust adequately to the prerequisites of the international economy will become unable to maintain its wealth. Without his encouragement and support I would certainly not be where I am now. In short, in responding to shifts in the international distribution of power states will be sensitive to institutional costs. Either way, they contribute to institutional resilience.
The United States depends no longer on the cooperation of its allies to prevail in a global stand-off. Neorealism posits that policies which produce these effects are induced by the structure of the international system. Structure and Policy: A Framework for Analysis 49 The coordination effects of political institutions are much more difficult to establish across the board. Approaches were neorealist, critical of neorealism or outright opposed to it e. First, for which resources would rational states strive in such a situation? Rather, there are strong forces for continuity even in the face of altered circumstances. Overall, then, history will matter. The rise of the United States to supremacy has been widely discussed1 and a brief look at some figures will suffice to illustrate it.
Rather, they constitute an important set of constraints and incentives that affects policy decisions but still leaves some freedom for action; or may even be ignored altogether — with adverse consequences for the state, which it will have to address later in its policies. Take an almost anarchic realm, say, a university department in which six professors receive individual budgets by splitting up the common departmental budget. If past policies are stabilized through institutions they will not be easily discarded, even if changes in the international distribution of power would seem to require this. The task of translating this theoretical claim into a guide for empirical analysis will be reserved to Chapter 3. France had carefully guarded its autonomy already during the Cold War Gordon 1993a, Sauder 1995. The analytical framework would thus lead one to expect a more positive attitude toward the idea of European defense integration, yet this may be more or less muted depending on the exact issue under consideration and the details of the institutions involved.
To better understand its character, I will briefly look at four typical kinds of action that could result from these incentives. These institutions make interactions reliable. It will also shed light on the details of the interplay of the two causal factors. These institutions may be intentionally designed to resist change. In periods of a stable balance of power there are strong incentives to stick to the status quo. States are even free to disregard the constrained balancing incentives altogether.